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A bankruptcy regime is a central pare of each nationalfinancial system. Yet no regime exists for
insolvent sovereigns. As a result, in good times too much capital flows into poor countries, and in
bad times this capital is repaid at the expense of the human rights of the poor in these countries.
This article examines the case for a sovereign insolvency regime, and considers Chapter 9 of the US
Bankruptcy Code as a model for such a regime.
The most charismatic and influential banker of the 1970s, Citicorp Chairman, the late
Walter Wriston, famously declared that "countries never go bankrupt."' His argument
was that "LDCs [less developed countries] don't go bankrupt... the infrastructure doesn't
go away, the productivity of the people doesn't go away, the natural resources don't go
away. And so their assets always exceed their liabilities, which is the technical reason for
bankruptcy. And that's very different from a company."2
Here speaks a man who clearly spent very little time outside the Northeast of the
United States. Infrastructure, if a country has it, can go away-Latin America's crumbled
throughout the 1980s as funding to maintain it simply was not available after the debt
crisis of 1982. 3 A people's productivity, if it exists, can go away, as educational systems fall
apart or a disease such as HIV/AIDS ravages the nation's human capital. Natural re-
sources, if they exist in meaningful amounts, can decline in value or the nation can lose the
capacity to harvest, extract, or export them.
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Furthermore, whether assets exceed liabilities is a poor test for national bank-
ruptcy-most of a nation's assets are not saleable. The normal legal test, that an entity
cannot service its debts as they fall due, also happens to be the right test to apply to a
nation. As a nation can only print its own currency, and as poor countries invariably can
only borrow abroad in other nations' currencies, 4 sovereign debtors can be unable to ser-
vice their foreign-currency denominated debts as they fall due.
Wriston's reasoning was utterly fallacious. But it served to justify a flood of loans to
Latin American and African nations in the 1970s and early 1980s, and is still quoted
regularly.5
Countries do go bankrupt, and creditors can go bankrupt lending to them. Argentina
was bankrupt in 2002. Much of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa was bankrupt in
1982 and Indonesia was bankrupt in 1998. Many African countries are bankrupt today.
Adam Smith, the father of economics, identified the clear need for a sovereign bank-
ruptcy regime in his seminal work over 200 years ago, when he wrote:
"When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner
as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed
bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonorable to the debtor, and
least hurtful to the creditor."6
Horst Kohler, as the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund in 2002,
spoke to the same problem as Adam Smith, when he said, "[T]he present arrangements for
resolving sovereign debt crises are not sufficiently transparent or predictable, and ... they
impose unnecessary costs on debtors, creditors, and the system as a whole." 7
Faced with a nation in crisis, the IMF simply has too few policy options at its disposal.
The Fund can continue lending or stop lending to the debtor.8 Those are its options. If
the nation's problems are caused by an unsustainable debt burden, more debt will only
make matters worse. Yet if the Fund stops lending, the debtor will usually be forced to
default, terminating or at least destabilizing capital flows not only to the debtor but usu-
ally also to its region or market segment. For instance, when Mexico struck problems in
late 1994 the resulting "Tequila Crisis" temporarily limited capital flows severely not only
to all of Latin America, but to all emerging markets nations. So the IMF is faced with a
very difficult choice in deciding to cut off a nation's access to funding.
4. Ross P. Buckley & Peter Dirou, How to Strengthen the International Financial System by Restructuring
Sovereign Balance Sheets, 2 ANNALS OF ECON. & FIN. 257 (2006) (and the discussion therein of 'Original Sin').
5. See International Monetary Fund, Money Matters: An IMF Exhibit-The Importance of Global Coop-
eration, Debt and Transition (1981-1989), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/nmi/eng/
mm-dt 01.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009); Daniel Altman, A Country in Chapter 11? Yes, but.. , N.Y. TssEs,
Jan. 6, 2002, § 3 at 1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htnl?res=9AO6EFD91E30F935A357
52COA9649C8B63; Paul Sweeney, Country Credit: History Lessons, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 2004;
Martin Wolf, Argentina's Debt Deal Leaves it Holding a Weak Hand, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005.
6. ADsAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTo T-HE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 468 (Edward
Cannan ed., 1976).
7. Horst Kdhler, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Remarks given at the Central Bank
Governors' Symposium: Reform of the International Financial Architecture: A Work in Progress (July 5,
2002), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2002/070502.hn.
8. The Fund cannot mandate a restructuring of the debt; that has to be an initiative of the commercial
bank creditors and/or the sovereign debtor.
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Yet today there is still no machinery or rules in place to facilitate or regulate sovereign
bankruptcy. The IMF's response to this paucity of options was to propose a Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism, an inadequate response for reasons that will be consid-
ered. Adam Smith was right in advocating, when necessary, a "fair, open, and avowed
bankruptcy" as the best course for both debtors and creditors. 9
Of course, when Adam Smith and contemporary authors write of sovereign bankruptcy
they mean something quite different from corporate or personal bankruptcy. A sovereign
nation cannot go out of business, the way a corporation can, and its assets cannot all be
liquidated so that the proceeds can be distributed among creditors. Sovereign bankruptcy
would involve a stay of execution by creditors while the procedure was in process, and
would result in the determination of an amount of debt relief that would, after it had been
affected, leave the debtor able to continue to service its remaining debts and afford to its
people their hasic human rights.
The term sovereign bankruptcy is therefore used in the literature as shorthand for a
formal procedure conducted according to rules that would result in some level of man-
dated debt relief. It is difficult to imagine any situation in which all of the debt would be
cancelled. Indeed, sovereign bankruptcy should lead to much the same type of result as
the long, protracted rescheduling negotiations which are currently the norm, viz. the debt
would be cancelled in part, and the balance rescheduled. The differences are that the level
of cancellation might be higher, as the power of debtors in the current negotiated solu-
tions is not great, and that the outcome would be determined by an independent forum,
not by the parties, and according to prescribed rules. In short, the process should be
fairer, swifter, and more certain than that which prevails today.
Walter Wriston was correct in only one sense when he said countries could not go
bankrupt. Bankruptcy is a legal construct. Without a court to administer bankruptcy, and
rules to govern it, an entity cannot be bankrupt, simply broke. In this narrow technical
sense only, until we have an international sovereign bankruptcy regime, administered by a
court or arbitral tribunal, nations can only be broke, not bankrupt. This article explores
why, when countries are broke, they need to be able to declare bankruptcy just as can
companies and individuals, and how a sovereign bankruptcy regime will benefit creditors
and debtors alike.
I. Sovereign Debt Crises in Modem Times-A Primer
Any analysis of sovereign debt crises in modern times must start in 1973.10 OPEC had
discovered the delights of being a cartel-the price of oil quadrupled almost over night.I
9. SMIT I, supra note 6.
10. For an excellent analysis of the first Latin American crisis, see FRANK G .DAWSON, THE FIRST LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS: THE CITY OF LONDON AND THE 1822-1825 LOAN BUBBLE (1990). See also CAR-
LOS MARIcHA.L, A CENTURY OF DEBT CRISES IN LATIN AMERCA: FROM LNDEPENDENCE TO THE GREAT
DEPRESSION, 1820-1930 (1989); EICHENGREEN & LINDERT EDS., THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1989).
11. For analysis of the debt crisis of 1982, see DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK (1984); STEPHYv
GRIFFTmH-JONES (ED.), THIRD WORLD DEBT: MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES (1989); Chris Huhne,
Some Lessons of the Debt Crisis: Never Again?, in 1sr'L ECON. AND FIN. MARKETS-THE AMEX BANK REVIEW
PRIZE ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ROBERT MARJOLIN (Richard O'Brien & Tapan Datta eds.1989); PEDRO-
PABLO KUCZYNSKI GODARD, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT (1988); ROBERT A PASTOR, LATIN AMERICA'S DEBT
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Banks accelerated their lending to developing countries to "smooth out the oil price
shock," i.e. to allow developing countries to keep buying oil without having to tighten
their belts and depress economic growth. The OPEC nations deposited their oil receipts
in the banks. 12 And the developed nations had a choice of two options to afford the
oil-they could earn more or spend less. As with individuals, spending less is rarely an
attractive option. So the nations chose to earn more, or, in their context, export more. To
do so they needed other nations to have money to buy their exports. This they ensured by
encouraging their banks to lend more to developing countries in a process Philip Wellons
termed, "passing the buck." 13
It was a neat trick. All other things being equal, the oil price rise would have plunged
Europe and North America into recession. But all other things were not equal-the gov-
ernments of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States formulated a plan to in-
crease their exports and avoid a recession by encouraging lending to their principal
markets-and the plan worked. More capital flowed south and the increased imports it
funded staved off recession in the developed countries. 14
The developed nations enjoyed strong economic growth. The OPEC nations enjoyed
ever-increasing credits with the world's major banks; and the developing nations "en-
joyed" ever-increasing debits with the world's major banks.
It could not last. The Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller, said so,
on the front page of the Wall Street Journal, in June 1974:
"Channeling massive flows of oil dollars from dollar-rich to dollar-poor countries
once seemed easily manageable. But now it looks more troublesome... My own
view... is that the process of recycling through the banking system may already be
close to the end for some countries, and in general it is doubtful this technique can
bridge the [payments] gap for more than a year or at the most 18 months."' 5
But Rockefeller's warnings fell on deaf ears. Bankers preferred to listen to Walter Wris-
ton.' 6 Wriston's assurance that countries cannot go bankrupt influenced more lending
decisions than any analysis by a credit committee and any warning by a Rockefeller.
Wriston's approach was more profitable in the short to medium term than Rockefel-
ler's, and so the capital kept flowing south for another eight long years until August 1982,
when Mexico announced it could no longer service its debts.
CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE (1987); J.D. SACHS (ED.), DEVELOPING
COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (1989); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN & UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
TRANSNATIONAL BANK BEHAVIOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRIsIs (1989); PHILLIP A. WELLONS,
WORLD MONEY AND CREDrr-THE CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES (1983).
12. For more on this, see Ross P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECON-
DARY MARKET (1999) [hereinafter Emerging].
13. PHILLIP A. WELLONS, PASSING THE BUCK: BANKS, GOVERNMEN-TS, AND THIRD WORLD DEBT
(1987).
14. Id.
15. Ross P. BUCKLEY, INTERNATIONAL FrNANCIAL SYsTEM (Kluwer Law International, 2008). Of
course, other bankers were of a different view.
16. And who, incidentally, was quoted as disagreeing with Rockefeller, in the same article, saying, "The
Great Crisis... ain't going to happen." Id. And Wriston enjoyed a higher reputation in the market than
Rockefeller!
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Mexico's insolvency triggered a cessation of capital flows to all of Latin America and
Africa, which, in turn, plunged the two continents into crisis. And this debt crisis, as
managed under the structural adjustment programs the IMF imposed on the debtor na-
tions, exacted a horrifying human toll.17 According to UNICEF, over 500,000 children
up to the age of five were dying each year in sub-Saharan African and Latin America in the
late 1980s directly due to the effects of the debt crisis and its management.' 8 A partial
solution to the debt crisis was crafted in the early to mid-1990s for much of Latin America
under the Brady Plan, but the debt crisis has never really been resolved for much of sub-
Saharan Africa. Accordingly, one can extrapolate the mortality identified by UNICEF
over many years in that blighted part of the world.
From this potted history of the debt crisis of the 1980s, two important points can be
gleaned:
1. The creditors were prepared to keep extending credit, far beyond reasonable levels,
because the absence of a bankruptcy mechanism meant they expected to be repaid by the
debtor nations increasing taxes and reducing social services to their people.
2. The debtors were prepared to keep borrowing, far beyond reasonable levels, be-
cause of the short time frames of politicians and the need at all costs to avert a recession to
be able to win the next election, as well as the effect, in many cases, of bribes paid by
creditors to individual politicians and technocrats.
3. The creditor nation governments encouraged this excessive extension of credit be-
cause it served their short-term interest in avoiding a recession.
After the debt crisis broke in 1982, the international banks required that all loans, cor-
porate and sovereign, be brought under the sovereign guarantee as a way of facilitating
rescheduling negotiations. This it did. It also improved the security of the banks dramati-
cally. The largest banks held the highest proportion of loans to the less creditworthy
private sector. Unsurprisingly, these were the same banks that had insisted on the sover-
eign guarantee in their role as members of the steering committees directing the
rescheduling negotiations. 19 The largest banks had engineered the socialization of irre-
coverable debts owed by private sector borrowers and the IMF facilitated, and at times
directed, the process.
17. Between 1981 and 1986 real GDP per capita fell ten percent in Mexico, sixteen percent in Argentina
and twenty-seven percent in Bolivia. Harold James, Deep Red-The International Debt Crisis and Its Historical
Precedents, AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1987, at 331, 340. See also Abbey, Growing out of debt-the African problem,
THIRD WORLD DEBT-MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES 159-60 (Stephany Griffith-Jones ed., 1989); Hos-
SEIN AsKAR, THIRD WORLD DEBT AND FINANCIAL LNU''OvATION: THE EXPERIENCES OF CHILE AND MFX-
ICO 19 (1991); JORGE G. CASTANEDA, UTOPIA UNARMED 5 (1993); Jerry Dohnal, Structural Adjustment
Programs: A Violation of Rights, 1 AusTL. J. OF HUM. RTS. 57, 72-74 & 77 (1994); Eichengreen & Lindert,
supra note 10, at 262-63; Duncan Green, Hidden Fist Hits the Buffers, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 1995, at
35; Wade Mansell, Legal Aspects of International Debt, 18 J. OF LAW AND Soc'y 381, 388-90 (1991);
MARICHAL, supra note 10, at 237; Silva-Herzog, The Costs for Latin America's Development, in LATEN
AMERICA'S DEBT CRisIS-ADUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE? 35 (Pastor ed., 1987).
18. UNICEF, The State of the World's Children, 1989, as reproduced in LNTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE U.S. FINANciAL SYSTEM: HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMTTEE ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 101st Cong., 160 (1989), (Statement of Dr. Richard Jolly, Deputy
Executive Director for Programmes, United Nations Children's Fund).
19. Emerging, supra note 12, at 43.
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The East Asian economic crisis was a different type of crisis. The debt crisis of 1982
had been a crisis of excessive indebtedness fuelling excessive consumption. The fiscal and
monetary policy settings of the East Asian countries were reasonable, and indeed prudent.
In the words of Laurence Meyer, a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System,
"By conventional standards, the monetary and fiscal policies of the developing Asian
economies prior to the crisis were largely disciplined and appropriate ...
[C]onsumer price inflation . . . was relatively subdued . . . [and] fiscal policy also
appears to have been disciplined ... Therefore, another important lesson of the Asian
crisis is that sound macroeconomic policies alone do not preclude crises."2 0
This latter crisis was the result of a number of factors including (i) fixed exchange rates
tied to an appreciating U.S. dollar when the currency of the countries' principal competi-
tor, Japan, was depreciating; (ii) weaknesses in the local financial sectors and their pruden-
tial regulation so that local banks were able to borrow heavily abroad and relend the
proceeds domestically without hedging the foreign exchange risks (i.e. relying utterly on
the peg of the local currency to the Dollar to hold); (iii) crony capitalism which further
eroded the effectiveness of prudential regulation; (iv) excessive capital inflows facilitated
by premature liberalization of local financial sectors; and (v) a region-wide loss of
confidence. 1
In East Asia in 1997, the great majority of the debt was to the private sector. But this
did not stop the taxpayer from eventually bearing it. The IMF-led bailouts, invariably
described as bailouts of Indonesia or Thailand or Korea, were, in fact, long-term loans to
these countries that had to be used to repay the short-term creditors. These loans thus
became debts of the nation and the bailouts were primarily of the creditors. 22
The consequences of the Asian economic crisis for the poor of the region were harsh.
In Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, over 10 million people
dropped below the poverty line from 1996 to 1998.23
Argentina plunged into a severe crisis earlier in this decade. The years from 1991 to
1998 had been a prosperous time in Argentina as foreign capital flowed in; Argentina's
economy performed strongly and inflation was under control.24 In these years, Argentina
significantly improved its banking system, more than doubled its exports, increased infra-
structure investment through privatizations and otherwise privatized a broad range of in-
dustries, experienced significant growth in oil and mineral production and achieved record
20. Lawrence H. Meyer, Lessons from the Asian Crisis: A Central Banker's Perspective (Levy Econ. Inst. Work-
ing Paper No. 276, 1999).
21. See generally Ross P. Buckley, An Oft-Ignored Perspective on the Asian Economic Crisis: The Role of Creditors
and Investors, 15 BANING & FIN. L. REv. 431 (2000) [hereinafter Oft-Ignored].
22. Id.; Charles W. Calomiris & Allan H. Meltzer, Fixing the IMF, 56 NAT'L INT. 88 (Summer 1999).
23. Leslie Elliott Armijo, The Political Geography of World Financial Reform: Who Wants What and Why?, 7(4)
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14 (2001).
24. GDP per capita increased an exceptional forty-four percent between 1991 and 1998. Miguel A. Kiguel,
Structural Reforms in Argentina: Success or Failure?, XLIV No.2 COMPARATIVE EcONOMIC STUDIES 83, 84
(Summer 2002) (percentage calculated from Figure 1). There was a brief hiatus in the growth during 1995 in
response to the Tequila effect: the contagion from Mexico's crisis in late 1994 and early 1995. Id. at 94-95.
VOL. 43, NO. 3
THE BANKRUPTCY OF NATIONS 1195
levels of agricultural and industrial output.2 5 Argentina was a darling of financial markets
and of the IMF and was toasted as "the best case of 'responsible leadership' in the develop-
ing world."26
Nonetheless, at the end of 1998 Argentina entered a severe recession. The timing was
dictated in part by the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the August 1998 Russian crisis
severely restricting capital flows to emerging markets economies, and also by the chilling
impact of its increasingly over-valued currency on Argentine export competitiveness.
Notwithstanding the years of prodigious growth in the 1990s, by the end of the decade
Argentina was experiencing the worst economic crisis in its history,27 and possibly the
worst peacetime economic crisis in world history.28 How did this happen? The principal
causes are threefold: the peso-dollar peg; massive inflows of foreign capital facilitated by
the almost complete liberalization of Argentina's capital account;29 and the corruption
that is endemic in Argentine society.30
The peso-dollar peg had effectively stabilized inflation. But the peg led to a progressive
overvaluation of the peso that stifled exports and promoted imports.
The capital inflows, in typical Latin American fashion, were used to finance budget and
current account deficits.31 Argentina thrived in the 1990s on borrowed money.32 Bor-
rowing to finance budget deficits is particularly problematic because this use of the funds
will not generate the foreign exchange to service or repay the debt.
Finally, corruption played its insidious role in rendering Argentina's economy pro-
foundly inefficient by increasing transaction costs and by diverting capital flows from their
25. Id. at 100-01. This is not to suggest that many of the privatizations were not deeply problematic. It is
always a profound challenge to realize appropriate prices for the privatization of major businesses and assets
in emerging markets nations for the range of potential purchasers is not wide and because of the risk of very
favorable prices for well-connected purchasers. The scrupulous and rigorous public accountability proce-
dures that would mitigate against the latter risk are rarely present. There is much to suggest that many of the
privatizations of the 1990s in Argentina were at a deep undervalue.
26. Editorial, Chaos in Argentina, NATION, January 21, 2002, at 3. See also Lance Taylor, Argentina: A
Poster Cbild for the Failure of Liberalized Policies?, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 28.
27. Kiguel, supra note 24, at 83; Martin Crutsinger, IMF Grants Argentina Debt Extension, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2002.
28. Duncan Green, Let Latin America Find its Own Path, GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 2002. On one estimate total
domestic financial assets shrunk from US$126.8 billion in March 2001 to US$41.5 billion in March 2002. If
this is correct it is one the most massive destructions of wealth anywhere in the world in the past thirty years.
See Business Monitor International, Economic Outlook, ARGENTsINA QUARTERLY FORECAST REPORT, 2002.
29. Feldstein, Argentina's Fall, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 (March-April, 2002); Taylor, supra note 26, at 28.
30. A minor factor that contributed to the crisis was the privatization of Argentina's social security system
in 1994. This meant the nation could no longer count social security revenues as revenues, and had to move
them off the budget. This led to substantial budget deficits that would not have existed under the former
system of accounting for these revenues. To remain compliant with IMF targets, Argentina then had to
reduce public expenditure to reduce its deficit which in turn contributed to the downturn. See Larry Rohter,
Giving Argentina the Cinderella Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 4, at 14 (citing Professor Joseph
Stiglitz).
31. Kiguel, supra note 24, at 101.
32. Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Toward a Sustainable FTAA: Does Latin America Meet the Necessary Financial Pre-
conditions? (Inst. for Int'l Econ. Working Paper No. 02-4), available at http://ssr.com/abstract=320843.
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intended destination into the private accounts of politicians, senior civil servants, and lead-
ers of industry. 33
The recession deepened into a severe crisis in late 2001 when the IMF refused to extend
further credit to the nation, believing its economic programs to be unsustainable. Com-
mercial lenders followed this lead; Argentina was denied access to capital and defaulted on
its external debt of some US$132 billion. The government was forced to float the peso,
and it sunk. The government also implemented "asymmetric pesofication," under which
dollar-denominated bank loans and deposits were redenominated in pesos. Banks were
required to convert their assets (such as loans) into pesos at a one-for-one rate and their
liabilities (such as deposits) into pesos at a rate of 1.4 to 1. This generated massive losses
for the banking system. The government then sought to compensate the banks for these
losses by a massive issue of government bonds of necessarily doubtful value. 34
Thus, the ultimate burden fell on the public purse by way of the government bonds
issued to compensate the banks for their pesofication losses. In the words of Pedro Pou,
the President of the Central Bank of Argentina until mid-2001, "The government has
transferred about 40% of private debt to workers... We are experiencing a mega-redis-
tribution of wealth and income unprecedented in the history of the capitalist world."
35
The living standards of over one-half of the Argentine people fell below the poverty
line, and over a third could not afford basic food. 36 Children were fainting in class from
hunger, regularly.37 Adults were rioting and breaking into supermarkets, regularly, in
search of food.38 UNICEF Argentina was concerned that stunted growth and reduced
mental capacities would be the long-term consequence of this economic crisis for millions
of the nation's children. 39
An effective sovereign bankruptcy regime could have ameliorated a substantial amount
of this human suffering in Africa, Latin America generally, Asia and Argentina. Effective
bankruptcy regimes bring many benefits at the national level, and they would also do so at
the global sovereign level.
I. The Benefits of Bankruptcy Regimes Generally
At the national level, the principal purposes of a personal bankruptcy system are gener-
ally enunciated as being to divide the assets of an insolvent debtor fairly and ratably be-
tween its creditors, and to allow an insolvent debtor the opportunity to make a fresh start
33. Paul W. Rasche, Argentina: Test Case For a New Approach to Insolvency?, STUDIEN VON ZEITFRAGEN,
Jan. 5, 2002; Ernest Sweeney, Argentina: the Current Crisis in Perspective, AMERICA, Feb. 11, 2002, at 19;
Naomi Klein, Revolt of the Wronged, GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2002.
34. Rasche, supra note 33; Latin Banks: Eyes on Brazil, 18(18) EMERGING MARKETS MONITOR 12 (Aug. 19,
2002).
35. Andres Gaudin, Thirteen days that shook Argentina-and now what?, 35 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMEp-
cAS 6 (Mar/April, 2002).
36. Mark Milner & Charlotte Denny, It'spenalty time for Argentina, GUARDIAN, May 8, 2002, at 1, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/may/08/argenina.intemationanews i; Sophie Arie, Rich Argen-
tina Tastes Hunger, OBSERVER, May 19, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/
19/argentina.sophiearie.
37. Arie, supra note 36, at 1.
38. TODD L. EDWARDS, ARGENTINA: A GLOBAL STUDIES HANDBOOK 57 (ABC-CLIO 2008).
39. Arie, supra note 36, at 1.
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free from the burden of accumulated debt (provided the debtor has not engaged in dis-
honest or otherwise improper financial conduct).40 Sir Roy Goode has identified four
objectives of corporate insolvency law: restoring the company to profitable trading, maxi-
mizing returns to creditors, providing a fair and equitable system for the ranking of claims
and identifying the causes of company failures and imposing sanctions for culpable man-
agement.41 All of the other literature on the topic is in similar terms. 42
What is missing from the literature is the notion that an effective insolvency regime will
improve dramatically the allocation of credit within an economy, and thus make the econ-
omy more stable. This I have termed the "systemic" aspect of bankruptcy - for without a
bankruptcy regime, any economy will, as a system, be unstable.
The fairness aspects of bankruptcy are important. Internationally their absence has cost
millions of lives. Notwithstanding this appalling mortality, however, the systemic advan-
tages of a bankruptcy system are arguably as, or even more, isuportant at the international
level. This is because the more immediate risk of loss under a global bankruptcy regime
would tend to moderate capital flows to developing countries. An effective global sover-
eign bankruptcy regime in the 1970s would have led to far less capital flowing south. The
real prospect of massive loan losses would have sharpened banker's minds. If a Rockefeller
said these loans were unsustainable, bankers would have listened, for if he was right, they
were set to lose billions.
These systemic advantages can help to ensure that the capital flows are more appropri-
ate to the needs and capacities of debtors to repay. Financial crises would thus be less
frequent and less severe because crises are so often the result of excessive inflows in pre-
ceding years. 43 Furthermore, in the event of a crisis, the workout would proceed more
rapidly and efficiently and thus the workout costs to creditors and debtors would be
reduced.
We take this systemic effect of bankruptcy for granted in domestic systems. If a bank
makes a poor credit decision domestically and lends to a borrower who subsequently be-
comes insolvent, absent security, most of the money will be lost. Without the prospect of
40. This is how the purposes of bankruptcy law are expressed in the leading Australian text, A. LEWIS,
AUSTRALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW I (Dennis Rose ed., Sydney: Law Book Co. 1994). Oddly enough, the
purposes of insolvency laws often receive scant attention in the literature. The classic Australian text on
liquidation, ANDREW KEAY & B.H. MACPHERSON, THE LAW OF COMPANY LIQUIDATION (4th ed. 1999), is
utterly silent as to the purposes of liquidation, as is the classic English text, IAN F. FLETCHER, Ti IF LAW OF
INSOLVENCY (2d ed. 1996).
41. R.M. GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 25-28 (2d ed. 1997).
42. The latest edition of the classic Australian text on liquidation, KEAY, supra note 40, enunciates purposes
in much the same terms as Sir Roy Goode, and Ian Fletcher's classic English text, supra note 40, is silent on
the issue. The most thorough Australian analysis of the principles that should underpin and guide a modem
insolvency law can be found in the AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON GENERAL INSOL-
VENCY INQUIRY Alrc 45 (1988). That report identified nine principles that should govern any insolvency
regime (corporate or personal) but did not address the systemic benefits of such a regime. Likewise, Finch's
excellent book, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES (Cambridge University
Press 2002) did not investigate the credit-allocation effects of an insolvency regime, although she touches on
some related matters in chapter 4, and specifically at 143-44.
43. Excessive capital inflows played a major role in the Debt Crisis of 1982, the Mexican tequila crisis of
1995, the East Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 and Russia's meltdown in 1998. See R.P. Buckley, A Tale of Two
Crises: The Search for the Enduring Lessons of International Financial Reform, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
Arp. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Tale]; Oft-Ignored, supra note 21, at 431.
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sovereign bankruptcy, lenders do not bear the full implication of poor lending decisions
internationally, and thus, excessive extensions of credit are likely. When nations have
unsustainable debts, they typically must repay them, as there is no alternative, save a
highly destabilizing default that may deny the nation access to commercial capital for
years. The debts are serviced through higher taxes and lower social services in countries
that are already poor-countries in which lower social services translate into malnutrition,
inadequate housing and health care, unsafe water, etc. The debts of effectively bankrupt
nations are repaid at the expense of the most basic human rights of their own citizens. We
still have something very like debtors' prisons for highly indebted nations. The Latin
American nations are still struggling to service the debt that was incurred in the 1970s in
the debt crisis. That debt has been restructured, reduced, and transformed into Brady
bonds. The bonds, however, are still some fifteen to twenty years away from being fully
repaid, and in the interim must be serviced, along with much of the debt incurred since
the 1970s. 4 Debt is a lifetime sentence for poor countries. The countries' wages, in the
form of foreign exchange earned from exports, are effectively garnished for thirty, and
sometimes up to forty-five years! 45
Given the human consequences of sovereign insolvency, and given the founder of eco-
nomics as we know it could see so clearly that, from time to time, it would be necessary for
nations to declare themselves bankrupt.46 Why has there never been put in place any
means for a country to do so?
Il. Why Is There No Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime?
The answer to why there is no global sovereign bankruptcy regime has five elements:
1. The lack, before the 1980s, of an overarching need for a sovereign bankruptcy
regime.
2. The profound difficulties of creating international institutions and gaining wide-
spread implementation of treaties.
3. The inability to compel participation in such a regime.
4. The perceived interests of the creditors.
5. The short term interests of debtors.
Each element will be considered.
IV. Absence of an Overarching Need, Until Relatively Recently, for a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime
Significant international financial crises are becoming far more frequent, and more se-
vere, as the growing interconnectedness of markets means that national crises, that once
would have been limited to that one country, now routinely spread throughout their re-
gion, and often to the other emerging markets of the world.
In the "good old days," developing countries had financial crises intermittently and
there was simply no pressing need for a supranational institution to deal with them; the
44. Oft-Ignored, supra note 21, at 446.
45. Tale, supra note 43, at 24.
46. See SmrTH, supra note 6.
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crises were insufficiently frequent to warrant it and were often quite limited in their geo-
graphic spread. Yet the proliferation of crises in the past thirty years means that today, for
the first time in history, any such institution would, if it were to exist, be consistently busy.
There are reasons for this recent proliferation of crises. The principal one is the con-
vergence of financial markets under globalization. Until the 1970s, most national finan-
cial systems functioned as relatively self-contained units - savings within an economy-
funded investment within that economy. The internationalization of finance since that
time has meant ever-increasing capital flows, particularly portfolio capital flows, between
nations. 47 Contemporary capital flows swiftly into developing nations when prospects
look good, and there is a surplus of liquidity in the developed world; capital flows as
swiftly out of those nations when storm clouds gather there,48 or prospects in the devel-
oped nations' markets look better. In the memorable phrase of Professor Michael Pettis,
our contemporary international financial system, particularly as it relates to developing
nations, is "The Volatility Machine."49
V. Difficulties of Creating International Institutions
History teaches us never to underestimate the difficulty of establishing an international
institution. Witness the abortive history of the International Trade Organization. The
ITO was to be the third Bretton Woods institution, to accompany the IMF and the World
Bank. These three institutions were the brainchildren of John Maynard Keynes and
Harry Dexter White-the Englishman and American charged with shaping the interna-
tional economic architecture after World War II (whose proposals were adopted at the
Bretton Woods conference). Keynes and White had fresh in their minds the experience of
the Great Depression that had dominated most of the inter-war years. They foresaw the
need for a regime of fixed exchange rates to promote international trade, a monetary fund
to assist with the implementation and operation of that regime, a development bank to
assist with rebuilding Europe after the war and aid the development of poor countries, and
a trade organization to ensure the liberalization and promotion of international trade.
The IMF and World Bank came into existence, but due to subsequent U.S. opposition,
the International Trade Organization was never formed, and only the treaty it was to
administer, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, was implemented.
The scale of accomplishment in establishing the IMF and World Bank should itself not
be undervalued. It took a global cataclysm, preceded by the Great Depression, to sum-
mon the political will to make those ideas reality. And it took years of failure by the
United States and European Union in the 1980s to extend the international trade regime
to intellectual property rights and services to persuade them of the need for an interna-
47. In 1970, the capital that moved around the globe to support trade in goods and services far exceeded
that which moved to support direct and portfolio investment. More recently, capital flows have outweighed
trade flows by a factor of over sixty to one. P. Sutherland, Chairman of Goldman Sachs Int'l & Chairman of
the Overseas Dev. Council, Managing the International Economy in an Age of Globalisation, The 1998 Per
Jacobsson Lecture at The Annual Meeting of the IMF and the World Bank (Oct. 4 1998). By institutional
investors, I am referring to mutual funds, pension funds, and other managers of other people's money.
48. R.P. Buckley, International Capital Flows, Economic Sovereignty and Developing Countries, Y.B. L'.'r'L
ECON. & FIN. LAW 17 (1999) [hereinafter International Capital].
49. M. PE-iTis, THE VOLATiLrITY MACHIN. xi (Oxford University Press 2001).
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tional trade organization, and to allow the ITO to come into being, fifty years late, as the
World Trade Organization.50
Indeed, fifty years was also roughly the gestation time for the International Criminal
Court that came into being in The Hague in 2002. The Nuremburg War Crimes Tribu-
nal was an ad hoc international criminal court formed for the purpose of trying the Nazi
war criminals of XVWI, and at that time, the need for a standing court was recognized
and articulated. The realization of that idea took fifty-six years. An international sover-
eign bankruptcy regime may have saved millions of lives in the 1980s, and so the need for
it was critical, but the idea was not seriously considered until the mid-1990s. In a much-
cited speech in 1995, Jeffrey Sachs argued that "IMF practices should be reorganized such
that the IMF plays a role far more like an international bankruptcy court and far less like
the lender of last resort to member governments." 51 Let us hope history is not a firm
guide to the gestation periods of such organizations, and we do not have to wait until 2050
for a sovereign bankruptcy regime.
VI. The Inability to Compel Participation in Such a Regime
Any particular regime will favor some groups over others, and compelling the participa-
tion of those likely to be disadvantaged will always be a problem. This is a direct conse-
quence of the absence of an international court with jurisdiction over such issues.
VII. Perceived Interests of Creditors
We do not have a global sovereign bankruptcy regime because the creditors believe its
absence works in their favor. The banks have argued vociferously against a bankruptcy
regime internationally when they accept, and indeed welcome, them nationally. Why? In
the words of William Rhodes, Senior Vice-Chairman of Citibank, "the existence of a for-
50. See R.P. Buckle,, The Changing Face of World Trade and the Biggest Challenge Facing the World, Today, in
THE WTO AND -HE DOHA ROUND: TiHE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE Ch. 1 (Buckley ed., 2003).
51. Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort, Frank D Graham Lecture at
Princeton University (April 20, 1995). This speech received considerable attention. At the same time, in
1995, the IMF prepared an extensive paper on the potential design and implementation of an international
sovereign bankruptcy regime which, because it was not published, received very little attention. See Note on an
International Debt Adjustment Facility (May 26, 1995) (unpublished Executive Board Internal Report of the
IMF). The earliest proposals for a sovereign bankruptcy regime seem to be in Goran Ohlin, Debts, Develop-
nent and Default, in A WORLD DIVDED: Ti-iE LESs DEVELOPED COUNTFRIES IN THE IN-TERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (GK Heleiner ed., 1996) and in Dollars, Diplomacy and Development: Hearings before the Snbcommit-
tee on International Development of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Cong.
43 (1977) (testimony of Phillip Wellons, Member, U.S. H.R.). The idea of using Chapter 9 as the template
for such a regime appears to have been first advanced by Kunibert Raffer in a paper delivered at a conference
at Zagreb University in 1987. K. Raffer, Speech at Zagreb University (1987). This speech was subsequently
published as International Debts: A Crisis for Whom?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTr AND WORLD DEBT 51-63
(H.WV. Singer & S. Sharma eds., 1989). The better known early paper by Kunibert Raffer on using Chapter 9
in the international context is Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically Efficient
Solution with a Human Face, in 18(2) WORLD DEVELOPMENT 301-313 (Feb. 1990). For more on the history
of the idea, see Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of
Ideas, 1976-2001, in 49(3) IMF STrAFF PAPERS 470-507 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/ExternalU
Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf.
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mal bankruptcy mechanism, whether invoked or not, would cause uncertainty in the mar-
kets, deter potential lenders and investors, and drive up the countries' borrowing costs."52
This is nonsense. National bankruptcy regimes greatly enhance certainty, and this
serves generally to attract lenders and investors and thus diminish borrowing costs; there
is no reason it would be any different internationally.53 On the other hand, there is no
formal structure for the resolution of sovereign debt crises and each crisis typically casts a
pall for many years on debtor country prospects and bank profits. Debtor countries suffer
with no new capital and ever-increasing debt loads, and banks suffer; in most cases, they
have to keep advancing new funds for years to enable the debtors to keep paying
interest.54
William Rhodes is the world's most experienced banker in sovereign debt restructur-
ings. He speaks as he does, presumably, because banks like the present arrangement
under which, when a crisis hits, the poor in developing countries are consigned to the
debtors' prisons of poverty, ill-health and ignorance55 so that the loans made by the banks
can be repaid.
The major international commercial banks appear unable to learn the lessons of history
or appreciate the benefits to themselves of a more enlightened approach.
The debt crisis of 1982 was resolved in part by the Brady Plan of the early 1990s under
which the loans were converted into bonds with principal or interest discounted by thirty-
five percent. History has proven that the debt relief in the Plan was necessary to allow
Latin American economies to grow again and restore capital flows to the region. The
Plan also gave the banks readily tradable bonds, rather than illiquid loans, that permitted
many banks to sell their exposure to investors comfortable with risk and free up their own
capital to move on and undertake new business. The Brady Plan proved to be a huge
boon to banks, yet, at the time, they resisted it strongly and only agreed to it under enor-
mous pressure from their own national banking regulators. 56
The banks were wrong to oppose the Brady Plan-in hindsight, it benefited the banks
more than the borrowers-and in opposing a global sovereign bankruptcy regime, the
banks have it wrong, again.
52. William Rhodes, The drawbacks of an orderly rescue, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002.
53. In the IMF's words, "In the domestic context, the existence of a bankruptcy law makes debt markets
more efficient [... 1. The same principle should hold for international capital markets." See IMF, Proposals for
a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM): A Factsbeet D.5, (Jan. 2003), available at http://
www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/sdrm.hm.
54. Emerging, supra note 12, at 33-34.
55. In developmental terms, virtually everyone agrees that the 1980s was a lost decade in Latin America
due to the Debt Crisis. (Even Anne Krueger agrees. See Krueger, International Financial Architecture for
2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Speech Delivered at the National Economists'
Club Annual Members' Dinner in Washington D.C. (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/speeches/2001/l12601.htm [herinafter Krueger I). No progress was made between 1982 and 1989
on debt relief or meaningful ways forward for debtor nations, therefore the continent's poor went hungry, its
young poor went uneducated, and its infrastructure crumbled as nations continued to service an overwhelm-
ing debt burden (usually through new loans which simply increased the total indebtedness). The debt
gridlock of the 1980s was in no one's long-term interests but damaged the debtors far more than the credi-
tors. See Marichal, supra note 10, at 237; and Emerging, supra note 12, at 34-36.
56. R.P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21
FORDHAIM INTT'L LJ. 1802, 1809 (1998).
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The fact that credit costs may well be higher with a sovereign bankruptcy regime in
place will not work to the detriment of creditors, because the benefits of less severe crises
should outweigh the detriment of a lower volume of lending. Whether higher credit costs
will, on balance, negatively affect debtors is considered below.
The other reason creditors prefer the status quo is that in a system without regulation,
power rules. While a sovereign bankruptcy regime would make the international financial
system more stable and therefore benefit banks and borrowers alike, it also represents a
step towards limiting the power of the international banks and thus is a step onto a slope
that, from their perspective, appears slippery. 5 7
VIII. The Short-Term Interests of Debtors
Any sovereign bankruptcy regime is likely to increase the cost of credit within debtor
countries, as creditors will factor in the enhanced prospect of losses in calculating interest
rates. As Hal Scott has written, "While this may be good for sovereigns in the longer
term, they would prefer not to take the medicine and continue to enjoy subsidized bor-
rowing rates due to bailout expectations."
In 2002, the Argentine and Brazilian governments were reportedly opposed to the
IMF's SDRM proposal because they feared it would raise their cost of financing in inter-
national markets.5 8
The politicians in debtor countries, like politicians everywhere, are focused primarily on
retaining power at the next election - improving the sovereign balance sheet in ways likely
to pay off substantially in six to ten years time, especially when this entails costs today,
rarely sits high on the agenda.
Many writers have advocated the establishment of a global bankruptcy regime as a way
of allocating losses more fairly between lenders and borrowers and of improving the effi-
ciency of the system.5 9 So what would a global sovereign bankruptcy regime entail?
IX. A Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime
The comprehensive approach would be to establish a standing sovereign bankruptcy
court. A more achievable approach, at least in the near term, would be to establish an ad
hoc tribunal for each case. In either case, the body would need to apply an agreed set of
rules and procedure. 60 A court would need to be implemented by a treaty between na-
57. Charles Seavey, The Anomalous Lack ofan International Bankruptcy Court, 24 BERKLEY J. OF INT'L L.
499, 520 (2006).
58. Press Release, World Bank, G20 Countries Disagree on Debt Defaults, Agrees to Free Trade (Nov. 25,
2002).
59. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Reforming the Global Economic Architecture: Lessons from Recent Crises, 54(4) J. FIN.
1508, 1515 (1999); K. Raffer, Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically Efficient
Solution with a Human Face, 18(2) WORLD Div. 301 (1990); K Raffer, International Debts, supra note 51, at
51; see K Rogoff & J. Zettelmeyer, Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy Reorganisation: A Survey, WP/02/
57, 10 (IMF Working Paper).
60. Presently, no court has jurisdiction over disputes between a sovereign state and citizens (such as banks
or bondholders) of another sovereign state-the International Court of Justice deals only with disputes be-
tween sovereign states. Michelle White, Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?, 1:2002 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTvrrY 21. Arbitral tribunals, such as those under the auspices of the International
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tions, and its establishment, rules, and regulations would require many years of planning
and negotiations. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal could be established quickly if implemented
by agreement between the creditors and a nation in difficulty, 61 although for the reasons
considered above, creditor agreement is unlikely. The ad hoc tribunal could be formed by
the creditors appointing two members to the tribunal, the debtor nation likewise ap-
pointing two members, and the four members then jointly appointing a fifth, to serve as
their presiding member.62
The two principal models generally considered as the basis for any sovereign bank-
ruptcy regime are Chapters 9 and 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 9 is entitled
"Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality." Chapter 1 1 is succinctly entitled "Reorganiza-
tion" and is available to allow corporations or partnerships to seek to trade their way out
of bankruptcy, under the supervision of a court.
,nuer a p er , modl, the decision of whcther to filc for sovcrcign bankruptcy
protection would be the debtors'. In domestic law the decision is likewise taken by the
debtor, but subject to two limitations: (i) the State must specifically authorize that debtor
to file for bankruptcy, 63 and (ii) the debtor must establish that creditors holding a majority
of claims have also agreed to this course of action, or that such agreement has been sought
in good faith and was not able to be gained.64 There is no state or other entity senior to a
national sovereign in the way that a State of the United States of America is senior to its
municipal governments or other entities. The second limb of this requirement of Chapter
9 could be incorporated into any set of sovereign bankruptcy rules.
This capacity to initiate bankruptcy proceedings should not be an incentive to go bank-
rupt. It is not an incentive in domestic practice within nations, and debtor nations gener-
ally seek to avoid default at all costs. In the words of Nouriel Roubini, "Governments try
to avoid, as much, and as long as possible, defaults as they are politically, socially, and
economically costly." 65 The norm is for even very poor nations to continue to service
their debt at the expense of the most basic human rights of their people. 66
X. A Chapter 9 Model for a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime
Chapter 11 proceedings are far better known than Chapter 9 proceedings and perhaps
for this reason, commentators often consider Chapter 11 when looking for a precedent for
a sovereign bankruptcy regime. But, while a sovereign is not a "political subdivision or
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), do deal with such disputes, but are, of course, not
courts. For more on ICSID, see R.P. Buckley, Now We Have Come to the 'ICSID' Party: Are Its Awards Final
and Enforceable?, 14 SYDNEY L. REv. 358 (1992).
61. Kunibert Raffer, Solving Sovereign Debt Overhang by Internationalising Chapter 9 Procedures, STUDiLN
VON ZEITFRAGEN (2002), available at http://www.jahrbuch2002.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Weltfinanz/RAF-
FER 1/rafferl .HTM.
62. Thomas Fritz & Philipp Hersel, Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process-A new road to resolve debt crises,
Discussion Paper (August 2002), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/FTAP-
english.pdf.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2007).
64. Id. § 109(c)(5).
65. Nouriel Roubini, Do We Need a New International Bankruptcy Regime?, Comments on Bulow, Sachs
and White (April 2002), available at http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-nroubini/papers/bankreg.doc.
66. R. Buckley, Why Are Developing Nations So Slow to Play the Default Card in Renegotiating their Sovereign
Indebtedness?, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347 (2005).
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public agency or instrumentality of a State"67 (the definition of municipality in the Bank-
ruptcy Code), it is closer to a local government than it is to the corporations which are the
subject of Chapter 11. More importantly, the issues that arise in the bankruptcy of a
nation are closer to those of a local government than a corporation. For these reasons,
Chapter 9 is the best place to start, and a close examination of its provisions and imple-
mentation in practice suggests it is the best precedent available for a sovereign bankruptcy
regime.
While Chapter 9 is not well known, there have, nonetheless, been about 500 proceed-
ings brought under Chapter 9 in its history, including 172 Chapter 9 reorganizations filed
between 1988 and 2005, "the vast majority by small government agencies like municipal
utilities, school districts, or entities established for a single project such as a hospital or
convention centre." 68
Chapter 9 was first enacted in 1934 during the Great Depression and the legislation was
amended extensively in 1978, and again in 1988 and 1994, to give it greater efficacy. The
only major county to reorganize under Chapter 9 in its modern, post-1978 form has been
Orange County.69
Chapter 9 has worked effectively and efficiently in the bankruptcy of local municipali-
ties within the United States, and has the standing of being a functional U.S. law. In the
words of the distinguished economist, Kenneth Rogoff, "Chapter 9 of the U.S. bank-
ruptcy code . . .has proven relatively effective." 70
The other major proposal by civil society to address this problem, the idea of a Fair and
Transparent Arbitration Process, is basically a Chapter 9 style proceeding facilitated by an
arbitral tribunal rather than a court. The difference is largely inconsequential. 71 What
matters is the fairness and efficacy of the rules and the independence of the tribunal, not
the tribunal's form as a court or arbitral tribunal or the form of proceedings as a court case
or arbitration.
The principal requirements for a municipality to be eligible to file for bankruptcy pro-
tection under Chapter 9 that are relevant to a sovereign are that it must: (a) be insol-
vent,72 (b) "desires to effect a plan to adjust its debts,"73 and (c) either (i) "...has obtained
the agreement of creditors holding... a majority in amount of the claims in each class that
[the debtor] intends to impair under a proposed plan," or (ii) "has negotiated in good faith
with its creditors and failed to obtain [such an] agreement," or (iii) established negotiation
is impracticable. 74
67. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
68. Robin Jeweller, Municipal Reorganization: Chapter Nine of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Congressional Re-
search Service (A CRS Report for Congress), CRS- 1 (Mar 8, 2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL33924_20070308.pdf.
69. Id. at CRS-4.
70. Kenneth Rogoff, International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability, 13(4) J. ECON. PeRSp.
20 (Fall 1999).
71. Thomas Fritz & Philipp Hersel, Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process-A new road to resolve debt crises,
(Discussion Paper August 2002), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/
FTAP-english.pdf.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2007).
73. Id. § 109(c)(4).
74. ld. § 109(c)(5).
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A municipality is defined by Chapter 9 to be insolvent when it is in a financial condition
such that (A) "it is generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are
the subject of a bona fide dispute;" or (B) it is "unable to pay its debts as they become
due."75 Immediately after a petition is filed, there is an automatic stay on all collection
actions against the debtor.76
Chapter 9 permits objections to the petition for bankruptcy. Objections typically relate
to whether the negotiations with creditors were conducted in good faith or whether the
petition was filed in good faith. If the court determines these good faith requirements
were not met, its remedy is to dismiss the petition, which returns all parties to the status
quo ante.77 A court may also dismiss a petition for lack of prosecution, unreasonable
delay, failure to propose a plan within the time the court has stipulated, material default
under a plan, and other causes.78
Claims have to be proved, and the court will fix a time within which this must be done.
If a claim appears on the list filed by the debtor, it is deemed proved unless the debt is
listed as "disputed, contingent on unliquidated." 79 Accordingly, creditors only need to file
for claims neglected or disputed in some way by the debtor. In the international context,
unless the relevant sovereign bankruptcy rules so prohibit, this stage of proving the debts
would give rise to an opportunity for debtor nations to allege debts are odious or illegiti-
mate. Odious debt has been aptly described as "a wobbly old doctrine of international
law."80 The idea is that sovereign debt is odious if (1) it is incurred for a purpose that does not
benefit the people of the debtor nation, and (2) "it is incurred without the consent of the people. "81
The reasoning is that the debt is that of the regime, which incurred it, but not of the
people, and hence it should fall with the fall of the regime.
While a detailed exploration of the notion of odious debt, or the broader notion of
illegitimate debt is beyond the scope of this* paper, the fact that such proceedings could
provide an opportunity for such allegations to be explored and tested is, in itself, a reason
for the major banks to oppose such a development or, alternatively, a reason to so draft
the rules governing the procedure as to exclude, or limit narrowly, the scope for the
debtor to argue that certain debts are unenforceable due to being odious or illegitimate.
Perhaps the most important section of Chapter 9 from the point of view of its applica-
bility to sovereigns is section 904, which provides that:
unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay,
order, or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with-
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.8 2
75. Id. § 101(32)(C).
76. Id. § 922.
77. Id. § 921(c).
78. Id. § 930.
79. Id. § 925.
80. Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (2007).
81. Patricia Adams, Iraq's Odious Debts, 256 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYsIs 2 (Sept. 28, 2004), http://www.
cato.org/pub-display.phppub id=2465; Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, LViF Seminar: Odious Debt,
6, April 2002, http://ww.imf.org/extemal/np/res/seminars/2002/poverty/mksj.pdf.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2007).
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The debtor can therefore go about its day-to-day activities and borrow money without
recourse to the court. 83 These restrictions were required to ensure the constitutionality of
Chapter 9 in the United States, 84 but they work equally well to preserve the sovereignty of
a sovereign debtor.
In a Chapter 9 case, there is no property of the estate and no estate to administer, and
so the court cannot interfere with the debtor's use of its property or revenues.85 The only
exception is in the very limited case in which the debtor refuses to pursue a cause of action
to set aside a voidable payment, "the court may appoint a trustee to pursue such cause of
action" under section 926.86
Except in this very narrow instance, there is no power in Chapter 9 proceedings to
appoint a trustee in bankruptcy or a receiver. This is appropriate, for the elected govern-
ment of the municipality (or sovereign nation) must be allowed to continue to govern. 87
There is also a "cram down" procedure, in American parlance. Acceptance of a class of
creditors to a proposed plan is required if the plan impairs the claim of the class. But,
when there is more than one class of creditors the claims of which are impaired by the
plan, the court may confirm the plan if at least one impaired class accepts the plan, and
"the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable" as between classes of
creditors. 88 There is a requirement that the plan be in the "best interests of creditors and
is feasible," 89 but this provision means something different under Chapter 9 than the simi-
lar wording under Chapter 11. Under Chapter 11, a plan is said to be in the "best interest
of creditors" if creditors would receive as much under the plan as they would if the debtor
were liquidated.90 Liquidation of municipalities (or sovereign nations) is not possible. So,
in the Chapter 9 cases, for a plan to be in the "best interests of creditors" and "be feasible"
has generally been interpreted to mean that it must be better than the other alternatives
available to the creditors. As the alternative to Chapter 9 is dismissal of the case, leaving
every creditor to fend for itself, the "best interests of creditors" test is usually interpreted
to mean the municipality must use reasonable efforts to repay its creditors, not that it
devote every available resource to the task.91
The bankruptcy court under Chapter 9 is not as actively engaged in managing the case
as in Chapter 11 proceedings. In Chapter 9, the court's role revolves more around ap-
proving the petition, confirming the plan of debt adjustment, and ensuring implementa-
tion of the plan.92 This again is highly suitable to the situation of sovereign debtors. It
83. See id. §§ 364, 901(a).
84. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 263-64 (1977) and Ashton v. Cameron Water Improvement Dist No. 1,
298 U.S. 513 (1936) (holding the first version of Chapter 9 unconstitutional because it infringed on sovereign
powers); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of the revised
enactment).
85. See the definition of "property of the estate" in 11 U.S.C. § 902(1) (2007).
86. Id. § 926.
87. Kunibert Raffer has noted that the inability to appoint a receiver of a nation has often been raised in
debates in Germany as a reason an international bankruptcy regime was unworkable: Raffer, supra note 59.
88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(10), (b) (2007).
89. Id. § 943(b)(7).
90. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
91. US Courts, Bankruptcy Basics, Chapter 9 Municipality Bankruptcy, http://www.uscourts.gov/ban-
kruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter9.html. See discussion in H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 400 (1977).
92. Id.
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would hardly be appropriate for a court or arbitral tribunal to be instructing a nation in
the conduct of its affairs in the way that Chapter 11 bankruptcy judges regularly intervene
in the affairs of corporations trading under Chapter 11 protection.
While there are differences between local governments and national governments,
there are many similarities between these levels of government, especially when one is a
large and formerly prosperous county in southern California. In December 1994, Orange
County filed for protection under Chapter 9, as a result of massive losses from the inap-
propriate use of derivatives in managing its (and other counties') investments, and
emerged from bankruptcy in February 2000. 93 In the words of a Congressional Research
Service report for Congress:
[T]the Code itself, as applied by the bankruptcy court, appears to have been suffi-
ciendly flexible to accommodate the operational needs of the County and the interest
of its creditors... the bankruptcy forum appears to have provided an appropriate and
efficient judicial mechanism for its resolution. The County qua municipality re-
mained in control of its 'political' affairs, that is, the operation of government and the
provision of public services, while the Country qua debtor was free to pursue both
litigation and negotiated settlement with its creditors. 94
In the national context, the intervention of the IMF in national Finance Ministries and the
imposition of austerity policies invariably prevent the country from providing appropriate
public services. Most debtor nations in crisis are prevented by the IMF from running
budget deficits sufficient to pay teachers or health care workers or provide the most basic
social services to their citizens, 95 despite considerable evidence that overly restrictive fiscal
settings are not conducive to economic growth in developing countries.
96
In short, what worked for Orange County would work far, far better than our current
arrangements for the poorer nations of the world. This should not be surprising, as adju-
dication under a predetermined set of rules by an independent forum should produce a
fairer and more certain and predictable outcome than the utterly unregulated negotiations
that resolve these issues today. Developing nations and the international financial system
would both be best served by a carefully crafted set of bankruptcy rules, modeled on
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and applied and enforced by independent
tribunals.
93. Jeweller, supra note 68, at CRS-10.
94. Id.
95. Michelle Wucker, Passing the Buck: No Chapter I I for Banknpt Nations, XVII(2) WORLD POL'Y J. 10
(Summer 2001).
96. In the words of the Center for Global Development, "The evidence suggests that LMF-supported fiscal
programs have often been too conservative or risk-averse. In particular, the hMF has not done enough to
explore more expansionary, but still feasible, options for higher public spending": Center for Global Devel-
opment, Does the IMF Constrain Health Spending in Poor Countries? Evidence and an Agenda for Action, http://
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/14103; See also Ross P Buckley and Jonathon Baker, IMF Policies
and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: CRisis, INSTITLTMONS AND POLITI-
cAL EcoNOMsy (Adrian Kay & Owain Williams eds., 2008).
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XI. Benefits of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime
So what advantages would a global bankruptcy regime with a highly developed, formal
system of rules bring? Six come to mind.
1. The unconscionable delays that occasion most sovereign debt workouts would be
shortened, to the benefit of creditors and debtors.
2. The appalling human suffering and the state mandated infringements of basic
human rights that have accompanied IMF Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers would be dramatically ameliorated by both the debt relief
granted to sovereign debtors, and by removing the IMF from the Ministries of Finance of
the debtor nations.97
3. Capital flows to less credit-worthy developing countries would be ameliorated by
the prospect of national insolvency. Reckless lending and reckless borrowing would be
constrained, and costs of credit higher. 98 All of this would be a good thing, for the effi-
ciency gains of cheaper credit are outweighed in poor countries by the damaging effects of
crises brought on by too much credit.
4. The international financial system would be far more stable, as capital would flow
within it only after far more careful credit decisions than is now the case. This greater
stability would benefit both creditors and debtors. In short, capital would tend to flow
between economies more as it does today within economies where the prospect of debtor
bankruptcy plays its cautionary role.
5. Creditor moral hazard would be greatly reduced. As the need for international
rescue packages (primarily facilitated by the IMF) would be greatly reduced 99 so would the
attendant moral hazard-these packages invariably require that the funds provided be
spent on discharging debt then due, and thus the packages bail out the creditors who
advanced short-term debt, the most destabilizing form of debt for a nation.
6. Debtor moral hazard should remain largely unaffected. As discussed previously,
nations are usually very slow to default on their loans. Indeed, in the view of Anne Krue-
ger and other experts, 00 nations usually postpone the day of reckoning and fail to seek
restructurings of their indebtedness when timely and required so that when the crisis
comes it is far more severe and destabilizing to the system than if the nation had sought a
restructuring and some debt relief earlier. There is no reason to expect that the existence
of a sovereign bankruptcy regime would reduce the commitment nations typically display
to servicing their foreign debt at all costs.
Early this decade, as alternatives to such a bankruptcy regime, the major banks and
banking industry associations proposed the mandatory inclusion of Collective Action
Clauses (CACs) in all sovereign bond documentation and the IMF proposed its Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism initiative. Each will be briefly considered.
97. Milner, supra note 36.
98. Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 L'\T'L LAWv 103, 125 (2003).
99. Id. at 103.
100. Krueger I, supra note 55.
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XII. Collective Action Clauses
Collective Action Clauses are clauses in debt documentation by which creditors agree in
advance to accept the determination of a majority of them, usually a super-majority of
seventy-five percent of creditors, as to any variation of the terms of the debt. This
removes many of the collective action problems inherent in bond debt, in which the bonds
may be held by hundreds or thousands of creditors. It prevents the occurrence of the
rogue creditor, in which small creditors may refuse to participate in a general restructur-
ing and then sue for repayment in the full, original terms after the great majority of credi-
tors have accepted rescheduled terms. 101 It makes a debt workout with bonds more
workable.
For many years, bonds issued under U.K. law typically had such clauses in them, and
those issued under New York law did not. The same sovereign issuers issued in both
markets. Research showed that CACs tended to lower the borrowing cost for more
credit-worthy issuers and raise it for less credit-worthy issuers. 102 Presumably, the more
credit-worthy benefit from being able to take advantage of a more orderly restructuring
process should it ever become necessary, whereas for less creditworthy issuers, any provi-
sion that makes a rescheduling easier is resisted. 0 3
In 2002, the United States and other G-10 nations were keen to see CACs included in
all sovereign bond contracts as an alternative to the SDRM approach of the IMF, and in
the years since CACs have become standard inclusions in bond documentation. Today,
they are the norm in bonds issued under New York law,104 just as they always have been in
bonds issued under English law. CACs do assist in debt restructurings, but do not remove
the need for a bankruptcy regime for two reasons: 05
1. CACs facilitate rescheduling, but do not, in and of themselves, afford debt relief
when only debt relief will give a nation a sustainable debt burden and enable it to honor
most of the human rights of its people. If a nation's debt burden is unsustainable, the
provision of further official finance by the IMF and the World Bank merely worsens its
situation. The solution "is less debt, not more." 0 6
2. The essential problems facing sovereign debt workouts are not collective action
problems among creditors, although these are significant. For instance, the workout for
the Debt Crisis took from 1983 to 1994,107 and yet this workout faced far fewer collective
action problems than any comparable workout would today because the debts in question
were loans by a relatively small number of banks, not bonds held by many creditors. The
banks were highly susceptible to the moral suasion of their respective central banks, and it
was this pressure, and this pressure only, that eventually led to the Brady Plan and some
101. Hal S. Scott, How Would a New Bankruptcy Regime Help?, 65(1) BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. AcTn'-
1ry 334, 336 (2002).
102. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? (1999 NBER
Working Paper No.w7458, Jan. 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7458; see also White, supra
note 50, at 19.
103. Id.
104. Lee C Buchheit, Supermajority Control Wins Out, 26 IrNcr'L FIN. L. Rpv. 21 (2007).
105. White, supra note 60.
106. Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public
Funds (Bank of Canada, Working Paper 2001-20, Nov. 2001).
107. See generally Emerging, supra note 12.
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relief for debtors, but a decade too late for most debtors! Collective action problems are
only a small part of the problem. The United States' push for CACs implicitly assumed
they were most of the problem, presumably to not have to deal with the real issues.
The problem with CACs is not that they will not help as they are, but that they are not
a solution for the sovereign insolvency problem. CACs were developed as an alternative
to the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposal, which the
United States initially supported but subsequently squashed. So what did the IMF
propose?
XIII. The IMF Proposal: The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
The SDRM was first proposed in a signal speech by Anne Krueger, First Deputy Man-
aging Director of the IMF in November 2001.108 The IMF's proposed scheme initially
received some favorable comment from the U.S. administration, but the administration
soon became a major critic of the proposal. In light of these criticisms, the IMF revised
the initiative considerably.
The IMF developed its SDRM proposal to address two problems it had identified. The
first is the absence of "adequate incentives for orderly and timely restructuring of unsus-
tainable sovereign debts."'109 The consensus is that developing country debtor govern-
ments tend to postpone initiating a restructuring of their debt until far later than is
optimal from the perspective of their creditors and their own citizens. 10
In the words of Anne Krueger:
Like a patient with a toothache avoiding a trip to the dentist, a debtor country will all
too often delay a necessary restructuring until the last possible moment, draining its
reserves and increasing the eventual cost of restoring sustainability. Creditors suffer
too, as the fear that some may be unfairly favored in a disorderly workout depresses
the value of claims on the secondary market and, at worst, may block agreement on a
necessary restructuring. All this can leave the international community with the un-
palatable choice of accepting a disruptive and potentially contagious unilateral de-
fault, or bailing out private creditors and thereby contributing to moral hazard.- 1
108. Krueger I, supra note 55; the proposal was substantially modified in a later speech, Anne Krueger, A
New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Speech at the conference "Sovereign Debt Workouts:
Hopes and Hazards," Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC (Apr. 1, 2002), available at
http://wwwjimf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/index.htm) [hereinafter Krueger I]. Finally, the propo-
sal was restated in Anne Krueger, Preventing and Resolving Financial Crises: The Role of Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, Speech to the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil (uly 26
2002), available at http://www.imf.org/externa~lnp/speeches/2002/072602.htm [hereinafter Krueger I1]. See
generally on the Krueger proposals, White, supra note 60, at 20.
109. Krueger II, supra note 108.
110. See Barry Eichengreen, Crisis Resolution: Why We Need a Krueger-Like Process to Obtain a Taylor-Like
Result (2002), http://-ww.econ.berkeley.edu/-eichengr/policy/iiekrueger.pdf, and Comments of Mohamed
EI-Erian as reported in James Smallhout, Critics Attack IMF's Standstill Proposal, 393 EUROMONEY 110 (Jan.
2002).
111. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Speech at the Confer-
ence on Sovereign Debt Workouts: New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update On Our
Thinking (Apr. 1, 2002), http://www.imf.org/extemaVnp/speeches/2002/040102.htn [hereinafter "Krueger
IV,].
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This tendency to be late to restructure is strongly supported by the prospect and actuality
of IMF rescue packages.'1 2
The second problem is that without a bankruptcy-type mechanism, the only choices
available when a nation is in serious financial trouble are a default (which is highly disrup-
tive to the debtor and potentially destabilizing for the entire international financial sys-
tem) or a bailout of the private creditors thereby, in Anne Krueger's words, "contributing
to moral hazard." 113
The IMF's proposal as developed, and later modified, had four principal elements:ii4
1. Majority restructuring to circumvent the collective action problems that are partic-
ularly prevalent with bond financing and to remove the free riding and rogue creditor
problems.
2. Deterrence of disruptive litigation by providing for any amounts recovered to be
Ueducted froii any eventual residual claims.
3. Protection of creditor interests by a restraint on the debtor paying non-priority
creditors and by an IMF assurance of good economic conduct by the debtor to give the
creditors an assurance the debtor will pursue policies that protect asset values and restore
growth.
4. Seniority for new lending, to attract it to the country.
The SDRM would also have involved the appointment of a Sovereign Debt Dispute
Resolution Forum, which is described as independent even though its members would be
nominated and endorsed by the Fund. The Forum would have power to decide disputes
between creditors and between creditors and debtors. Its role, however, falls far short of
that of a bankruptcy tribunal and the SDRM falls far short of the bankruptcy regimes that
are an essential part of all national economic systems."15 Specifically there were seven
problems with the SDRM initiative:
1. Because the SDRM was not a bankruptcy regime, it could never have insisted on
debt relief for debtors, even when debt relief was required for a nation's economic
viability. 116
2. The determination of whether a nation qualified for debt restructuring was to be
made not by the Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum as one would expect, but by
the IMF.
112. Eichengreen, supra note 110.
113. Krueger M, supra note 108. "Moral hazard" describes any system that protects parties from the conse-
quences of their actions and thus holds out inducements to seek to profit from misbehavior. See C.W.
Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, 17 CATo J. 275 (Winter 1998). Two classic
instances of moral hazard are the U.S. Savings and Loan crisis brought on by lax prudential supervision and
government insurance of S&L deposits. See BarryJ. Eichengreen & Michael Mussa, Capital Account Liberali-
zation: Theoretical and Practical Aspects, LMF Occasional Paper No.172 43-44 (1998). And Russia's economic
collapse of 1998 exacerbated by a massive inflow of foreign capital in reliance on Russia's geo-political signifi-
cance ensuring an IMF bail-out of creditors. See Ross P. Buckley, The Essential Flaw in the Globalization of
Capital Markets: Its Impact on Human Rights, 32 CAL. W. LN-T'L LJ. 119, 125 (Fall 2001).
114. IMF, supra note 53; see also Krueger H, supra note 108.
115. Ann Pettifor and Kunibert Raffer, Report on the IMF's conference on the SDRM, Jan. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/4303 I.html.
116. Notwithstanding newspaper headlines such as Martin Crutsinger, IMF Plan Would Let Countries Declare
Bankuptcy, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 30, 2002, at 8; the SDRM, by the LMF's own admission, was
not a bankruptcy regime and never intended to be one.
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3. The determination of a nation's level of debt sustainability, from which the neces-
sary amount of debt reduction would follow as a matter of logic, was to be made not by
the Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum as one would expect, but by the IMF. 117
4. The IMF would have discharged these two critical functions while compromised by
its status as a major creditor of the debtor (as virtually every country requiring debt re-
structuring has debts to the Fund), and presumably with one eye upon the recoverability
of its own loans. That one should never be a judge in one's own cause is a fundamental
principle of due process and natural justice that the SDRM proposal ignored. In Hal
Scott's words, "the IMF is not impartial. Allowing the IMF to operate the SDRM mecha-
nism would be like putting a class of secured creditors, rather than a court, in charge of a
corporate reorganization."" 8
5. The SDRM was to apply only to commercial bank debt; not Paris Club, IMF, and
World Bank debt.'19 This meant that even considerable debt reductions by commercial
creditors might have been insufficient to return debtor nations to viability as the overall
debt burden on the nation would be insufficiently reduced. Any effective response to the
problem of sovereign insolvency needs to apply to all debts of a sovereign.
6. In response to U.S. criticism, the stay on enforcement of claims that was featured in
the initially proposed form of the SDRM, and is a part of virtually all domestic bankruptcy
regimes, was dropped and replaced by the less effective "Hotchpot Rule," under which
any amoufts recovered by a creditor are deducted from the creditor's eventual entitle-
ments.' 20 In the words of Charles Tabb, "In no way is hotchpot a substitute for a stay." 12 1
7. The laws and rules that the Forum would have applied were never drafted - so the
IMF was in effect requesting support for a process the details of which were unknown and
incredibly important.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given it was a creation of the IMF, the SDRM would have
entrenched the IMF in its role as international debt and economic crisis policeman by
establishing a legal basis for that role - a role it has conspicuously failed to discharge well
since taking it on in late 1982.122 Under IMF structural adjustment programs, the 1980s
were a lost decade in Latin America and Africa. The IMF's initial policy prescription of
budgetary austerity for the nations most affected by the Asian economic crisis in 1997 was
wrong, as the Chief Economist of the World Bank identified at the time and as the Fund
itself subsequently tacitly admitted by endorsing expansionary policy settings in those na-
117. Kunibert Raffer, The IMF's SDRM-Another Form of Simply Disastrous Rescheduling Management?, in
SOVEREIGN DEBTS AT THE CROSS ROADS (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006).
118. Hal S. Scott, supra note 98, at 126.
119. Official inter-governmental loans are rescheduled through a process known as the Paris Club.
120. See Kunibert Raffer, To Stay or Not to Stay-A Short Note on Differing Versions of the SDRM, Jan. 31, 2003,
http://www.jubileeresearch.org/news/raffer3 10103.hm.
121. Comments of Professor Charles Tabb on an earlier version of this paper, e-mail from Charles Tabb,
Professor, Coll. of Law at the Univ. of Ill., to the author (Apr. 19, 2008, 12:00:00) (on file with author).
122. See HAL S. ScoTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INT'ERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY &
REGULATION 1243-45 (5th ed., 1998); Defending the IMF?, 1216 INT'L FIN. R. 104 (an. 17, 1998) (which
cites the criticisms of Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist of the Vorld Bank); David E. Sanger, Maybe a Bank-
rupt Nation Isn't the Worst Thing in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, § 4, at 6; Deborah Orr, Developing
Countoy Risks Expose Limitations of Basle Committee Principles: Doubt Falls on Banking Code, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 23, 1997, at 3. For some of the best criticisms of LMF policies in Latin America in the 1980s see
Castaneda, supra note 17; Dohnal, supra note 17; Carlos Mansell, LegalAspects ofInternational Debt, 18(4) J. L.
& Soc'Y 381 (1991); MARICHAL, supra note 10.
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tions. Argentina was a model IMF pupil in the decade up to its catastrophic meltdown in
late 2001 - a meltdown that was the direct result of IMF-endorsed policies. 12 3
It appears that the United States opposed the SDRM partly because it represented an
expansion in IMF powers, 124 and partly, and perhaps more so, because the major banks
opposed the idea. At the Spring Meeting of the Fund in 2003, the Fund's governing body
nixed the idea. 125
The SDRM proposal sought to make the current debt restructuring process more effi-
cient without addressing any of the inequities of the present system. In the IMF's words,
"We are not proposing a bankruptcy mechanism for countries, but simply a mechanism to
facilitate debt workout negotiations between a debtor and its creditors."1 26
Yet a bankruptcy mechanism is precisely what is needed. One purpose of a rules-based
system is to redress power imbalances by the application of fair and just rules - to replace
the law of thc jungle under which the most powerful wins, with the rule of law under
which justice should out. The SDRM failed this test. In seeking to render the current
system more efficient, it sought to entrench and enhance the power of the Fund itself and
the creditors without offering any improvements over the current system for the debtors.
In cases of sovereign insolvency, debt relief is often essential, for only debt relief may
allow insolvent nations to grow and develop again. Under the SDRM, debt relief would
only be available if debtors were able to extract it from creditors by negotiation. How
likely this is depends on the attitudes of creditors towards debt relief.
Throughout the 1980s, the creditor community resisted vigorously all calls for debt
relief as a response to the Latin American and African debt crisis. 127 As Donald Regan
said in the early 1980s, when he was the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury:
I don't think we should just let a nation off the hook because we are sympathetic to
the fact that they are having difficulty. As debtors, I think they should be made to pay
as much as they can bear without breaking them. You just can't let your heart rule
your head in these situations.
128
123. Ross P. Buckley, Do Cry for the Argentines: An Analysis of Their Crisis, 18 BANKING AND FIN. L. REV.
373 (2003).
124. John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks to a conference organized
by the Institute for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
po2056.htm.
125. In the delicate language of such bodies, "The Committee welcomes the work of the IMF in developing
a concrete proposal for a statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) and expresses its appre-
ciation for the IMF management and staffs efforts.... The Committee, while recognizing that it is not
feasible now to move forward to establish the SDRM, agrees that work should continue on issues raised in its
development that are of general relevance to the orderly resolution of financial crises[.]" Press Release No.
03/50, IMF, Communique of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Gover-
nors of the International Monetary Fund (Apr. 12, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/
pr0350.htm.
126. IMF, supra note 53.
127. Solving the Debt Crisis: Debt Relief and Adjustment: Hearing on the Less Developed Country Debt
Crisis Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs", 101st Cong. 330 (an. 5, 1989)
(statement of Bresser Pereira, LC); and L.C. Buchheit, Debt restrctring-speak: '?Senor, que pasa?', INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 10 (Mar. 1991).
128. Quoted by William J. Quirk, in Will an Underdeveloped Countries Debtors' Cartel Squeeze the Big Banks?, 47
Bus. AND Soc'y REV. 4, 10 (1983).
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The first Brady Plan restructuring for Mexico in 1989 was a slow process as hundreds of
banks resisted it strenuously, principally because it contained an element of debt relief.
Many banks were reportedly "disgusted" with the deal but in the end had to go along with
it under intense pressure from their central bank regulators.129 This has been the consis-
tent stance of creditors to debt relief.
A revealing insight into creditor thinking in this regard can be gained from a letter from
the Chief Executives of five financial market associations to Horst Kohler, then Managing
Director of the IMF, expressing concerns over the IMF's SDRM proposal.130 As the in-
dustry associations wrote,
We disagree strongly with several of the key assumptions that were used by Ms.
Krueger as the basis for her proposal: (1) that there is a collective action problem
preventing creditors as a group from reaching agreement on restructuring terms for
countries that have an 'unsustainable' level of external debt; (2) that IMF assistance to
debtor governments has the effect of 'bailing out' private creditors; and (3) that the
proposed framework offering a debt country legal protection from creditors would be
analogous to domestic bankruptcy procedures.31I
To deny the existence of collective action problems among bond creditors is a long bow to
draw. 132 Sovereigns typically have thousands of separate bondholders, and to seek the
agreement of all to any change in the terms of the bond is exceptionally difficult, and the
main reason CACs are a step forward.
To put the word "unsustainable" in quotation marks to suggest that nations do not have
unsustainable debts is unethical. The most impoverished nations today spend four times
more repaying debt than on health, education, sanitation and other basic needs. 33 Such
debt can only be serviced at the direct expense of the human rights, and often the very
lives, of millions of people 34 and can only be considered sustainable by those whose moral
compass has gone utterly awry.
To deny that IMF bailouts serve to bail out private creditors is, quite simply, outra-
geous. The JMF itself admits that this is the consequence of IMF-organized loans to
sovereign debtors in times of crisis - in fact, such a use of the funds is mandated by the
129. Commercial Bankers Say Brady Plan is a Non-starter, 795 Ir'L FIN. REV. 8 (Sept. 30, 1989); Hurricane
beading for Brady Plan, 794 INr'L FIN. REV. 12 (Sept. 23, 1989).
130. Letter from Clifford R. Dammers, Secretary General, International Primary Market Association, John
L. Langton, Chief Executive and Secretary General, International Securities Market Association, Marc E.
Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association, Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Associa-
tion, and Michael M. Chamberlin, Emerging Markets Traders Association, to Mr. Horst Kdhler, Managing
Director, IMF (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://www.sifna.org/regulatory/comment-letters/comment let-
terarchives/30597343.pdf.
131. Id.
132. See Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317
(2002). Furthermore, any study of the resolution of the debt crisis in the 1980s discloses substantial collective
action problems-and this in the days when the debt was in the form of loans owed to relatively few banks, not
in bonds and owed to a plethora of bondholders as is the case today.
133. The total external indebtedness of developing countries in 2000 was $2,492 billion. See World Bank,
2002 World Development Indicators 199 (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/de-
faulytWDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/1 0/12/000094946_0210120412 542/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.
pdf.
134. Dohnal, supra note 17.
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terms of the loan.135 The financial industry associations assert that "private creditors have
and undoubtedly will continue to experience substantial losses on their exposure to
emerging market sovereign debtors who have experienced payment difficulties."136 True,
entirely true; so what? No one asserts that bailouts shield creditors from all losses. The
problem is that bailouts protect creditors of short-term debt from much of the losses that
a free market would impose upon them, thereby encouraging the type of debt that en-
hances volatility and reducing systemic stability, while also promoting moral hazard. 13 7
Bailouts are an utterly unwarranted interference in the operations of the market, especially
when they invariably result in the socialization of private corporate debt.
The third objection of the financial industry associations has substance: the SDRM is
not analogous to domestic bankruptcy procedures, and that is precisely the great weakness
with it.
These attitudes of commcrcial bankers to debt relief aie mirrored in those of rich na-
tions and the multilateral agencies they control. As Jeffrey Sachs has written, "The guid-
ing principle of debt relief (on official debts) in the past 20 years has been to do the
minimum possible to prevent outright disaster, but never enough to solve the debt
crisis."138
For as long as creditors are adopting such positions, there will be little prospect of
negotiated justice for debtor nations under any version of an SDRM; a proposal that
leaves virtually all substantive issues to negotiation between creditors and debtors. 139 Ul-
timately, the strongest argument for a sovereign bankruptcy regime, and against the
SDRM, arises from the long-standing attitudes of creditors to debt relief.
XIV. Conclusion
The history of the past fifty years tells us that debtor nations usually continue to service
their debts even when they are broke and can do so only by borrowing ever more debt. 140
Countries can always repay loans precisely because they can always increase taxes and
reduce spending on health, education, and nutrition; but at some point with poor coun-
tries, such reductions in spending lead to utterly unconscionable hardship.
National bankruptcy regimes seek to ensure the maximum return to creditors while
ensuring the debtors have food, housing, and the capacity to work. Humane nations tol-
erate nothing less. We rejected debtors' prisons centuries ago. 14 1 The absence of an in-
ternational bankruptcy regime means people starve, and live without adequate shelter,
healthcare, and education, while their country's wealth goes to service loans. Yet national
135. Charles W. Calomiris & Allan H. Meltzer, Fixing the IMF, 56 TIlE NAT'L LNT. 88 (Summer 1999); see
also SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 122.
136. See Letter from Clifford R. Dammers to Mr. Horst K6hler, supra note 130.
137. International Capital, supra note 48, at 17; Ross P. Buckley, Six Lessonsfor Banking Regulatorsfrom the
Asian Economic Crisis, chapter in PERSPEcrVFS ON BANKING, FINANCE & CREDIT LAW (Weerasooria ed.,
1999) at 51; Tale, supra note 43, at 42-43.
138. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Resolving the Debt Crisis of Low-Income Countries, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
AcTvrrY, 257-86, at 274-75 (2002).
139. Scott, supra note 101.
140. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 132.
141. An excellent analysis of the history of the early common law remedies against debtors, including impris-
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bankruptcy laws were introduced for this very reason: to ensure insolvent debtors could
have adequate food and shelter. Why is it that what is unacceptable within any developed
nation is considered acceptable by the international financial community when it applies
in other, poorer, borrowing countries?
The need for an effective global bankruptcy regime for nations will not go away. In the
words of one commentator, "In the absence of a strong push for a [...] global bankruptcy
court, the losses to overall global economic efficiency from emerging market crises of
liquidity quickly becoming crises of solvency (resulting in unnecessarily destroyed domes-
tic economies), are likely to mount."142
The pressure from civil society for an effective global bankruptcy regime must be in-
creased. Bankruptcy is an essential element of all domestic economic systems offering
equity for debtors and creditors and systemic stability. As Adam Smith identified over 200
years ago, an effective bankruptcy regime is needed for sovereign states. It would amelio-
rate capital flows to debtor nations by making creditors price in the real risks of the credit,
and provide major benefits in terms of fairness and systemic stability to the entire interna-
tional financial system - benefits that will translate into fewer and less severe financial
crises - and into a massive reduction of unconscionable human suffering. Sovereign bank-
ruptcy is an idea whose time has come. Extensive work is required to ensure it comes to
pass.
142. Armijo, supra note 23, at 390.
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